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MARXIST ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL REVOLUTION, I946-I948 * 
Anthony Reid 
For the PKI leaders in the 1950s, the failure of the Indone-
sian revolution was partly attributable to the failure of the commu-
nist party itself, In the period prior to the adoption of the 
Jalan Ba:t'U policy of August 1948, the party had trusted too much in 
the Indonesian national bourgeoisie and too little in the interna-
tional forces of socialism; it had lost its freedom of organization 
and failed to stress sufficiently its work among peasants and its 
activity among soldiers and workers in the Dutch-occupied zone. (1) 
This judgement might appear posthumously to justify Tan Malaka's 
policies, and to sustain the view that a more radical PKI line might 
have succeeded in resolving Java's rural problems along lines ana-
logous to China or Vietnam. 
Leaving aside the external question whether the great powers 
and the Outer Islands would have allowed such a revolution to 
succeed in Java, this is in some respects an attractive suggestion. 
It needs to be examined far more carefully than it has been, however, 
in particular by research into the reasons for communist defeat 
after the adoption of the Jalan Baru in late 1948. By laying all the 
blame for the 'Madiun affair' at the feet of the Hatta government, 
public PKI analyses of the revolution have sidestepped this issue 
al together. 
Marxist 'Conservatism', 1946-1947 
The spontaneous populist upheavals and daulat operations of 
1945-1946 did in fact obtain support and encouragement from local-
level communists. The PKI founded by Mr Jusuf in October 1945 had 
a programme of nationalizing land and all key enterprises, and 
introducing pure socialism. "The social revolution is the only way 
* 
(1) 
Some of the material in this paper is expressed in a broader 
context in my The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950, 
(Melbourne, Longman, 1974). 
D.N.Aidit, Lahirnja PKI dan Perkembangannja, (Jakarta, 1955), 
pp. 27-34. 
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to eliminate and destroy the exploitation of the common people", it 
declared. (2) Branches of the party in South Sumatra and East Suma-
tra in late 1945 had a more opportunistic, but hardly less radical, 
policy. Communist, to many of those involved in the social revolu-
tionary wave, meant 'super-revolutionary'; revolusioner ya:ng konse-
kwen; the readiness not only to talk revolution but to act it. 
The 'international' Marxists who rallied to the Sjahrir-
Amir Sjarifuddin government at the end of 1945, however, took a 
generally dim view of disturbances which sullied the good name of the 
Republic abroad. As their critics complained, they had more confi-
dence in the progressive nature of the post-war European governments 
than in the revolutionary potential of Indonesian society. The 
weight which this group threw against the 'social revolutions' and 
other disturbances was a very large factor in the reestablishment 
of some measure of bureaucratic control in Java and Sumatra. 
In taking this position the 'international' Marxists in the 
government had no difficulty finding orthodox justification for their 
position. The arrival of Dutch communist party members Abdulmadjid 
Djojoadiningrat, Setiadjit, and Maruto Darusman, convinced and ex-
perie'1ced exponents of the common front against fascism, provided an 
authoritative vocabulary. It was they in the first instance who 
denounced Tan Malaka as a Trotskyist, deepening the gulf between him 
and the Marxists in the government. It was they too who enabled 
government leaders to denounce worker control of factories and plant-
ations with the unanswerable catch-phrase 'anarcho-syndicalism' . 
Amir Sjarifuddin pleaded with workers to support the government and 
al low its agents to run these installations, for as Lenin had said, 
the state was "the instrument for destroying every effort of the 
capitalists". (3) 
Amir Sjarifuddin and Abdulmadjid Djojoadiningrat flew to Me-
dan in a British plan to try to restore order in the wake of the 
'social revolution' there. Amir pleaded with the militant revolution-
(2) Benedict Anderson, Java, in a time of Revolution, Occupation, 
and Resistance, 1944-1946, (Ithaca, 1972), p. 218. 
(3) Amir Sjarifuddin's speech of 8 June 1946, as cited in J.O. Sutter, 
Indonesianisasi: Politics in a changing Economy, 1940-1955, 
(Ithaca, 1955), Volume II, p. 378. 
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aries of East Sumatra: 
"As a Marxist and a leader of the Socialist party I want an 
egalitarian society with fair distribution. But every 
theoretician of revolution must accept that that struggle and 
aspiration must be attained in stages ... Mao Tze Tung once 
said: 'Our struggle now must be directed to the first phase, 
with the second phase delayed for the time being.' "(4) 
The pemuda, Amir went on to complain, tend to be preoccupied with the 
romanticism and heroism of their own struggle, but they should not 
think the peasants any less heroic for getting on with the job. 
The Marxists in government believed they should concentrate 
on power rather than policy during the initial stage of the revolu-
tion. Apart from some democratization of local government soon after 
coming to power, the internal policies of the Marxist-led governments 
of 1946-1947 were remarkable for their caution. Relatively conservative 
members of the PNI and MASJUMI monopolized the economics and finance 
ministries. The programme enunciated by the Sayap Kiri, SOBSI and 
the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasant Front) during 
1946-1947 were mildly reformist, seeking only nationalization of the 
largest banks, utilities, and a few key branches of production. 
There were no serious plans for land reform, beyond the periodic de-
mand for abolition of the oonversie-reoht within the old vorstenlan-
den - a demand which arose from the grassroots rather than from the 
party. 
Until 1948 then, the attitude of the mainstream Marxist lea-
dership in Indonesia was firmly against mixing social revolution with 
the basic formula for national revolution, especially if this was 
likely to involve chaos and bloodshed. Any systematic attack on the 
hierarchic structure of rural society had to be postponed. 
Reforms in the desa, 1946-1948 
The orbit of the central Republican government's own authori-
ty, in central Java, corresponded with one of the most hierarchically 
organized areas in Indonesia. The period 1946-1948 saw reforms in two 
areas of Javanese rural life - village government and the conversie-
recht. In both cases this was the result of pressure from below 
giving rise to very limited legislative reform at the top. 
(4) Soeloeh Merdeka (Medan), 10 April 1946. 
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The colonial order had rewarded the Javanese village elite, 
the pamong desa, not with salary but with the usufruct of land, in a 
systematization of older feudal practice. When added to the personal 
property of his family, the tanah bengkok (official land) of the 
lurah (village head) was sufficiently extensive to give him a wealth 
and status far above that of the ordinary villager. The minor pamong 
desa generally enjoyed a bengkok allocation less than a tenth that of 
the lurah. Although the Dutch had introduced elections by landhold-
ers, these occurred only at the death of the incumbent lurah, and 
rarely did more than confirm the succession of his son. 
In the months after Japan's defeat became known in rural 
Java, many lurahs were forced out of office. The way in which 
pressure was mobilized has been described in one case. (5) 
"Shortly afterthe fall of Japan, a Tamansari villager .... 
returned to deliver his (rice) quota and was called before 
the lurah. The villager insisted that, since the Japanese 
government had fallen, there was no longer any obligation to 
deliver quotas. An argument developed and the lurah struck 
him ... The event immediately became a cause celebre and was 
converted by the lurah's opposition into an issue with which 
to force his dismissal. A mass meeting of the whole kalura-
han (village) ... unleashed the resentments of the preceding 
few years, and the leaders at the meeting were in vigorous 
agreement that Hadji Daran should be dismissed. The district 
office in Modjokuto accepted the decision, Daran resigned, 
and a new election was held." 
Even though duplicated all over Java, such actions implied no necessa-
ry structural change. Very frequently the unpopular lurah simply 
retired in favour of his son. Where there was sufficient upheaval to 
bring about a switch from one leading family to another, this was 
usually because a sant:r>i candidate used the opportunity to unseat an 
abangan incumbent, or vice-versa. In such cases the villagers some-
times successfully demanded a reduction of the lurah's bengkok, the 
source of his dominance in the village, and a distribution of the 
surplus among landless peasants. This represented reform of the sys-
tem, not revolution; its significance lay in demonstrating the capa-
city for action of the generally quiescent Javanese peasant mass. 
Since organized revolutionary politics had not yet reached 
(5) Robert Jay, Religion and Poli tics in Rural Central Java, (New 
Haven, 1963), p. 69. 
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the villages, utilization of this capacity for permanent change was 
dependent on the existing conservative bureaucracy. The maximum that 
could be achieved in these conditions is apparent in the special 
region of Yogyakarta, where the local prestige and power of Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono and his closeness to the national political elite made 
revolution from above possible. In April 1946 the Yokyakarta govern-
ment announced that new elections would be held for lurah, pamong desa, 
and a legislative council in each desa. Three or four villages were 
grouped together to form a larger desa community thought capable of 
supporting a council, after which elections for the enlarged villages 
were held during 1947. A ceiling of 4 hectares irrigated or6hectares 
unirrigated land was placed on the new lurah's bengkok - an area still 
at least ten times the avarage peasant holding. (6) Bengkok above 
this limit was declared common village property (kas desa) whose pro-
duct should be used on village projects. 
These Yogyakarta reforms were the maximum achieved by the 
revolution in the Javanese village. The central government declined 
in November 1945 to extend its democratic reforms to the village level 
after a defence of traditional Javanese adat (customary law) by some 
members. Several Residents and bupatis did order elections of new 
lurahs in order to head off the wave of actions from below. Viewed 
in perspective, however, the structural changes introduced into the 
village by the revolution were at most an updating of a powerful 
tradition. The disappearance of unquestioning acceptance of lurah 
authority, noted by Jay in 1953-1954 (7) was a more fundamental pro-
duct of revolutionary politics, but it has not proved to be permanent. 
The other major area of peasant pressure on the Republican 
Government in Yogyakarta was that of agricultural estates. The major 
cash-crops of the central Java region - sugar, tobacco, and, as a 
wartime expedient, cotton - were grown on peasant land in alternation 
with the peasants' own rice crops. For peasants in areas affected by 
these plantation crops, the right to do as they pleased with their 
land, free of the conditions imposed by Dutch estates under colonial 
government, was the real essence of independence. Only in such areas 
(6) 1 hectare = 2.47 acres. The village studied by Jay (ibid. p. 44) 
had also reduced the lurah's bengkok to 5 hectares. Only 153 
of its 735 families held more than one hectare in 1953. Larger 
bengkoks are still common in other areas. 
(7) Jay, op. cit. , p. 46. 
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~re they had a common, clear-cut objective, did peasants give 
:ive support to the BTI. The BTI was initially dominated by 
llowers of Sjahrir and remained loyal to the government until the 
lit in the Socialist Party (PSI), when communist influence began to 
oinate. In general the politicians who led it were free to form-
1te whatever pro-government policies they wished, but on the issue 
the estate lands there was consistent pressure for change from 
low. 
The first victory of the BTI was in the Madiun Residency in 
rch 1946. With the Resident's approval all existing leases between 
= estates and the peasants for the planting of estate crops were 
1celled. New leases were drawn up for the 1946-1947 planting year 
terms drafted by the BTI itself. The main concentration of sugar, 
)acco and cotton estates, however, was in the former princely lands 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Special legislation for these areas in 
18 had recognized individual peasant rights to land, where previous-
all land had been regarded as the property of the ruler. Peasant 
ghts were limited, however, in lands suitable for sugar, by the 
ler's continued conversie-recht (right of conversion), whereby he 
uld arrange the lease of peasant land in his domain to estates on an 
ternating basis with peasant crops. The boards set up to administer 
gar and other estates in the name of the Republic continued to oper-
e on the basis of this law of 1918. 
Peasants in the Yogyakarta area brought the issue forcibly to 
e government's attention in April 1946 by destroying cane and 
ocking irrigation channels on land planted in sugar. The Yogyakarta 
gional government made some minor concessions and promised a new 
w regulating estates within three years. In early 1948 demands 
thered momentum again, this time centred in the Klaten kabupaten of 
rakarta, the biggest concentration of sugar land. The BTI, now 
presented in the BP-KNIP, pressed for the abolition of the conversie-
cht. When discussion of the issue was cut short by a Presidential 
cree of 3 March regulating conversie for the corning year, the BTI 
ganized a very effective series of peasant demonstrations throughout 
rakarta and Yogyakarta, culminating on 1 April. The BP-KNIP hurried-
passed law number 13 of 26 April 1948, annulling those sections of 
e 1918 law relating to conversie. In theory this made farm owners 
.lly masters of their land, though doing nothing for the landless 
asants who had provided most of the demonstrators. The effect was 
so counter-balanced by a decree imposing on lurahs the obligation of 
suring that sufficient cash crops were produced to meet the govern-
nt' s needs. Nevertheless this did amount to a meaningful and 
'pular land reform, a unique example of government response to 
so 
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peasant pressure. Land reform was not part of any of the government 
programmes, and the BTI itself had no specific proposals beyond this 
one. 
The Communists move Left, 1948 
The Marxists' fall from power in January 1948 naturally 
brought a radicalization in their attitude to the revolution, which 
was reinforced by international developments. The international 
dimensions of this problem have been very well discussed by Ruth 
McVey. Here I wish only to focus on communist policy towards the 
rural problem in Java during 1948. This is of special interest 
because it was the only attempt by national-level political leaders 
during the revolution to provide radical solutions from above to the 
problems of the Javanese village. 
The agitation of early 1948 for the abolition of the conver-
sie-recht already showed FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakyat - later merged 
into an enlarged PKI) leaders the potential for political action from 
a peasant base. The next step along the same path was a rural strike 
at Delanggu, between Surakarta and Klaten. This was the heart of the 
same estate belt which had produced earlier protests. 
The strike appears to have begun with purely local and 
specific grievances, in a sack-making factory and cotton-plantation 
at Delanggu. Responsibility for both enterprises was in the hands of 
the government-appointed Badan Tekstil Negara (State Textile Agency) 
in Surakarta, against which an initial demonstration had been organiz-
ed on 19 May. Over 500 Delanggu workers, organized by the local BTI 
and SARBUPRI (Plantation Workers Union) branches, descended on Sura-
karta to press their demands. They argued that inflation had reduced 
their wages to a fifth of the appropriate level, yet they received no 
rice and cloth allowance like other civil servants. In addition they 
demanded union representation in the BTN. When the demands were not 
fully met, the sack factory workers and 17,000 SARBUPRI members on 
Delanggu plantations began their strike on 26 May. Interrupted for 
abortive negotiations on 1 June, the strike began again on 23 June. 
By this time the national SOBSI leadership had come out in strong 
support of the strikers, (8) while the MASJUMI Minister of Prosperity 
(8) On 21 June SOBS! explained its support of strike action by arguing 
that the appropriate internal policy in a national revolution was 
anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. SOBSI therefore authorized 
"strikes which take the form of corrective-constructive action 
towards elements which endanger the national revolution." Buruh, 
22 June 1948. 
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had entered the negotiations on the side of management. MASJUMI sent 
its peasant union affiliate, STII, into Delanggu to work the idle 
fields, which by 10 July had led to some nasty clashes with strikers 
and at least one death. Before the strike was settled in favour of 
the workers on 16 July, units of the West Java Siliwangi Division and 
the Tentara Pelajar had come to the defence of the STII, occupying 
several villages of Delanggu. (9) 
Delanggu was another demonstration of the power the FDR could 
mobilize by supporting peasant demands. It inaugurated a series of 
FDR-backed strikes among organized workers. Delanggu also demonstrated 
for the first time, however, the dangers to which political polari-
zation in the Javanese village could lead. At the grassroots the 
conflict between STII and BTI was no longer one of national politics 
or international ideology, but of the clash of two cultures, santri 
and abangan. 
The above two issues had involved only those peasants involved 
in estate production of sugar and cotton - the backbone of BTI strength. 
The Marxists were at last moving, however, towards an attack on the 
hierarchic village structure itself. At the end of June Supeno com-
plained in the PESINDO weekly Revolusioner, "Up until today we have 
never given attention to the peasants and workers as basic revolution-
ary forces. What we have fed them with has been nothing but high-
sounding words." (10) The previous week the same journal had attacked 
"the general assumption which has changed little, that the desa has a 
static character which can with difficulty be changed." (11) Now the 
young activists of PESINDO must begin to take seriously the task of 
modernizing the village. In particular, the 'feudal' nature of the 
bengkok system must be tackled head on. This was the heart of Java-
nese rural conservatism. 
During May and June the FDR leaders devoted considerable 
efforts to forming a 'National Programme' with the PNI and MASJUMI, 
the basis for a national front. Agrarian reforms bulked largely in 
(9) The Delanggu strike is most fully covered in J. Jahmin, "Kekua tan 
Sosial Kiri dan Persetudjuan Renville" (Unpublished skripsi 
sarjana, Gajah Mada University, 1971), pp. 46-61. See also 
Muhammad Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia (Jakarta, 1951), 
p. 168; G. McT Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 266. 
(10) Revolusioner, 29 June 1948. 
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the programme eventually negotiated on 21-24 June, even if their 
implications were far from clearly spelt out. A new agrarian law was 
proposed, based on private possession of land, "without ruling out the 
formation of collective or cooperative agricultural enterprises." 
Peasant land should be extended at the expense of "erfpaoht, klein-
landbouw, concessions, and state land which is clearly not in use." (12) 
During June FDR leaders held meetings throughout Republican Java 
popularizing moderate agrarian reforms of this type. 
An explicit attack on the system of bengkok came only after the 
arrival of Musso in August 1948. On 4 September Musso told a BTI 
Congress in Yogyakarta: 
"The agrarian revolution, the division of land to the peasants, 
must be carried out in this time of revolution. For this, the 
desa administration must first be democratized ... Feudal 
elements must be eliminated. Bengkok lands must be returned 
to the peasants to be worked by themselves." (13) 
The way in which this was to be done had already been outlined in the 
Jalan Baru policy adopted by the PKI Politburo under Musso's guidance 
at the end of August. Explaining that the slogan "land for the 
peasants" could not be fulfilled because of the land shortage in Java, 
the statement concluded: 
"··· for the time being, the peasantry will be better helped 
by not dividing among them the lands which accrue to them as a 
result of the abolition of feudal forms in the agrarian sector. 
Rather, this land will be handed over to the village, and it 
will be the village which will regulate the allocation of this 
land and decide on the requests of the peasants in a manner 
which will benefit them." (14) 
Action began immediately. From mid August the FDR/PKI press 
began reporting favourably on peasant action to take over and work 
for themselves former bengkok or other village land. "The peasant 
movement based on the National Programme is quietly gathering 
strength." (15) The National Programme's call for an abolition of 
(12) The lengthy Program Nasional is in Buruh, 22, 23 and 25 June 1948 . 
(13) Buruh, 4 September 1948. 
(14) Cited Ruth McVey, The SoViet View, pp. 65-66. 
(15) Buruh, 30 August, 1948. 
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feudal relics on the land was now advanced to justify the abolition of 
bengkok, although no such radical proposal had in fact been agreed. A 
list of actions on the village land issue, in the order they were 
approvingly described in the FDR/PKI daily Buruh, indicates the type 
of policy being promoted in August-September 1948: 
1. In Pajang (Surakarta), the Sarekat Rakyat (SR) began to work 
collectively 22 ha. of village land formerly auctioned each year 
by the pamong desa to the batik merchants of Lawean. 
2. A desa in Boyoladi distributed 95 ha. of kas desa to landless 
peasants. (16) 
3. Desas in Purbaya, Kudu, Siwal, Kadilanggu, and Pandean (all 
Surakarta Residency) decided that the kas desa and former tanah-
conversie should be worked by landless peasants, who would keep 
75% of the product for themselves. 
4. In Patjitan (the coast south of Madiun) various desas led by the 
SR demanded that 110 ha. of state and forest land be distributed 
to peasants. 
5. In Gunung Kidul the BTI demanded that tanah bengkok be distributed 
to peasants. (17) 
6. A meeting of 500 representatives of 23 desas in the Kecamatan Adi-
mulyo (Karanganyar, near Surakarta), on 11 September, confirmed 
the decision of the pamong praja and lurahs of the Kecamatan three 
days earlier to distribute 750 ha. of tanah bengkok to the people. 
7. On 30 August tanah bengkok of the desa Tirtosari was surrendered, 
while 12 other desas, all in the Kedu Residency, followed this 
lead. 
8. A model example of how to end the bengkok system was provided by 
the desa Leses (Kapanewon Manisrenggo, Yogyakarta). The pamong 
desa agreed to abolish 19 ha. of their bengkok, to be governed 
democratically by the village. This land would be worked by "the 
most diligent group, i.e. farm labourers and poor peasants", who 
would enjoy 2/3 of the product while the other 1/3 went into desa 
funds, to pay salaries to the pamong desa. 
(16) Ibid., 21 August 1948. 
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9. The desa Pasirharjo (Blitar), led by its lurah, divided land to 
poor peasants. 
10. 400 plantation workers in Ngadirenggo (Wlingi), demanded, with 
SARBUPRI support, that 700-800 ha. of erfpacht of the foreign 
estate 'Gabru', be distributed. (18) 
Whether such a programme could have succeeded without the 
military and political polarization which cut it short, is a matter 
for speculation. Already before this polarization crystallized into 
rebellion on 18 September, there was plenty of evidence of the bitter-
ness which the campaign created in rural Java. On 7 September a BTI 
spokesman, Sadjarwo, complained in the BP-KNIP: 
"Now that the peasant masses are acting to eliminate feudal 
elements in accordance with the National Programme, the 
Interior Minister [the MASJUMI leader Sukiman] has given secret 
instructions to use armed force to crush them." (19) 
According to PESINDO sources, MASJUMI speakers at a rally in Lodoyo 
(Blitar) on 12 September attacked the PKI programme of abolishing 
bengkok, and suggested MASJUMI members buy arms to protect themselves. 
The following day the leading leftists of Lodoyo were arrested. (20) 
Except in villages which were unusually homogeneous, the land 
reform campaign was conducted by abangan leaders of PESINDO, BTI, and 
SR, and opposed by santris. The rapidly deteriorating political 
situation in September 1948 ensured that it was conducted hastily. 
This was still more the case after the battle was joined on 18 Septem-
ber. In the Wonogiri-Sukoharjo area, which the communists controlled 
for several weeks, Dimyati states that "they divided sawah bengkok by 
force, as the beginning of the revol.usi sosial-." (21) There is evidence 
(18) Ibid., 16 September 1948. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in 
JOg}""akarta (Ithaca, 1962), pp. 177-178, also mentions the brief 
BTI campaign to distribute l.ungguh (i.e. bengkok) to landless 
peasants. In general, however, his account emphasizes the 
hierarchic nature of Yogya society, and the reliance of the BTI 
itself on traditional vertical bonds rather than class conflict; 
see especially pp. 166-171. 
(19) Buruh, 8 September 1948. 
(20) Ibid., 18 September 1948. 
(21) Muhammad Dimyati, op. cit., p. 203. 
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from various regions, however, that the programme degenerated into 
killing or capture of the richest members of a village, especially the 
lurah and wealthy santris, and plunder of their houses. (22) It 
appears to have contributed little to active support for the communist 
cause, and much to the hardening of aliran tensions. 
(22) See especially Robert Jay, op. cit., pp. 27-29 and 73-76; and 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Dia jang menjerah", in Tjerita dari Blora 
(Jakarta, 1952), pp. 277-340. 
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